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COMMENT 
LITIGATING INCEST TORTS UNDER 
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Incestuous child abuse is a problem of alarming proportions. 
A recent study involving 930 women from California's Bay Area 
indicated that sixteen per cent of the women who participated 
(one out of six) had been sexually abused by a relative before 
the age of eighteen. 1 
Many women2 who have been the victims of incestuous 
abuse are bringing civil actions for damages against their abus-
ers.3 Such litigation can be an important source of redress for 
these women; it can both empower the victim and force the 
abuser to take responsibility for his actions.· In some cases these 
tort claims are being tendered to the alleged tortfeasors' home-
owner's insurance carrier for defense and indemnity under the 
liability coverage provisions. II No California appellate court has 
1. D. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 10 
(1986). 
2. See generally D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1984). While there are men 
who are victims of incestuous abuse as well, most of the information available is about 
father-daughter incest and by far the great majority of victims are women. It is esti-
mated that up to 97% of the incestuous assault cases involve a male perpetrator. S. BUT-
LER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST 5 (1978). See also D. FINKELHOR, 
SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 75 (1979), in which the author reports that almost all 
sexual abusers are men. 
3. See, e.g., Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 609, 609-10 (1983). 
4. See, e.g., J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 169 (1981). The author notes that 
the conviction of an incest offender through the criminal justice system generally has a 
positive effect on the victim and the incestuous family. See also, Tort Remedies, supra 
note 3, at 617 n. 55 (reporting a telephone interview with S. BUTLER, author, CONSPIRACY 
OF SILENCE, in which the benefits of a civil proceeding are discussed). 
5. None of these cases has reached the appellate court level in California, but there 
539 
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addressed the issue of whether insurers are liable for coverage of 
incest torts under homeowner's policies. However, some cases 
have settled at the trial court level with the insurer paying part 
of the settlement.8 This Comment will address insurers' liability 
for incest torts under standard homeowner's insurance policies. 
It primarily will examine potential liability in light of the inten-
tional act and household exclusions which are typically con-
tained in homeowner's policies. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The tort based on incestuous abuse is relatively new. The 
unique characteristics of incesF present significant challenges 
for victims seeking legal redress. 
Women who choose to pursue legal action face two major 
obstacles. One is the possibility of a time-bar based on the stat-
ute of limitations;8 another is the liability issue with respect to 
any homeowner's insurance contracts held by the alleged abuser. 
Both can best be understood by examining the effects of incest 
on the victim and the characteristics of the perpetrator. 
are some trial court cases where an alleged incestuous abuse offender is being sued under 
his homeowner's policy. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Graff, No. 283832 (Supe-
rior Court of California, County of Contra Costa filed March 14, 1986). There are a num-
ber of out of state cases which have reached the appellate court level. See, e.g., MacKin-
non v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984); Rodriquez v. Williams, 107 
Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986). 
6. See, e.g., Orman v. Orman, No. 266051 (Superior Court of California, County of 
Contra Costa filed Nov. 20, 1984); Hertz v. Symmons, No. 257623 (Superior Court of 
California, County of Contra Costa filed Mar. 23, 1984); Katz v. Birnberg, No. 324334 
(Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento filed Nov. 29, 1984). 
7. This Comment adopts the broad definition of incestuous assault proposed by S. 
BUTLER, supra note 2, at 4-5: "any manual, oral or genital sexual contact or other explicit 
sexual behavior that an adult family member imposes on a child, who is unable to alter 
or understand the adult's behavior because of his or her powerlessness in the family and 
early stage of psychological development." Assault under this definition is not limited to 
sexual intercourse but includes "any sexual activity or experience imposed on a child 
which results in emotional, physical or sexual trauma." Id. at 5. 
8. See Comment, supra note 3, at 628-30 (arguing that victims of incestuous abuse 
should be permitted to plead the delayed discovery exception to the statute of limita-
tions for personal injuries). See also, Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute 
of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 191 (1985); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving 
the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 189 (1984). 
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A. CHARACTERISTICS OF INCEST THAT LEAD TO TIME-BAR 
PROBLEMS 
The incest victim may experience profound psychological 
problems.9 In childhood these problems may be expressed as 
anxiety, hostility, low self-esteem and feelings of guilt, shame 
and inferiority.lo Adult women often find themselves unable to 
form intimate relationships; they can suffer extreme isolation, 
sexual dysfunction and deep mistrust of men.l1 They frequently 
suffer from addictions to drugs or alcohol. 12 These injuries may 
or may not ever be linked to the abuse that caused them because 
of a "massive repression"13 that often occurs in victims.14 It is 
this "massive repression" of the memories of the incestuous 
abuse that causes statute of limitations problems. Commonly the 
victim of incestuous abuse does not recognize the harmful effects 
of the abuse until well after it has stopped. 111 In particular, chil-
dren who suffered violent abuse or abuse in the very early child-
hood years may not even begin to remember the trauma they 
suffered until well into adulthood. IS This process of discovering 
the harm may take a number of years.u 
Once the injuries have been discovered, it often takes addi-
tional time, with the aid of professional psychological interven-
tion, for the victim to transfer blame from herself to the perpe-
trator.lS Because of the characteristic lengthy discovery process 
such women go through, it is very rare that an action can be 
brought within one year19 of the date of the injury, the tradi-
9. See, e.g., D. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND 
WOMEN 386 (1986); S. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 5; J. HERMAN, supra note 4, at 29; D. 
FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 188-99 (1984). 
10. See, e.g., J. HERMAN, supra note 4, at 30. 
11. Id. at 31. 
12. Id. at 99. 




17. Id. at 246. 
18. See D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 214 (1979). 
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) imposes a one year limitation 
for commencing actions that involve "[l]ibel, slander, assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, seduction, injury or death from wrongful act or neglect, forged or raised checks, 
injury to animals by feeder or veterinarian." Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 352(a)(l) (West 
1982 & Supp. 1988), the statute of limitations is tolled until a person entitled to bring 
3
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tional tort standard. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF INCESTUOUS FAMILIES 
Any analysis of the insurance liability issues involved in 
civil actions based on incestuous abuse should take into consid-
eration the characteristics of the incestuous family. 
Very little is known about the perpetrators in incestuous 
abuse cases.20 Most of the information available about incestu-
ous family systems is contained in studies of father-daughter in-
cest.21 Little information is available about incestuous abuse in-
volving brothers, uncles or grandfathers.22 
One researcher has suggested that incest occurs when cer-
tain preconditions are met.23 First, the father's relationship with 
his wife has deteriorated to the point where he begins to take a 
sexual interest in his daughter whom he can manipulate to fulfill 
his sexual and emotional needs.24 Second, the father's natural 
inhibitions against incest might be overcome by a setback in his 
career or, frequently, by alcohol.21i He tells himself that he really 
loves his daughter and that no great harm will result from his 
sexual attention to her.28 Additionally, the wife/mother does not 
provide appropriate protective support for her daughter, but 
rather is absent physically or emotionally.27 Finally, the daugh-
ter's resistance to her father is not strong because she trusts 
him.28 She likes the attention and affection she is getting even if 
she hates what he is doing to her.DB She may keep silent about 
the abuse because she fears that the family will fall apart if she 
speaks.30 Descriptions of the perpetrator range from that of a 
such an action reaches the age of majority. 
20. D. FINKELHOR, supra note 9, at 52. 
21. Id. at 226. 
22. Id. at 62, 227. 
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moralistic, authoritarian figure31 to that of a timid and unasser-
tive person with poor social skills.32 
III. CIVIL ACTIONS BASED ON INCESTUOUS ABUSE 
A. THE CAUSES OF ACTION 
Practitioners representing incest victims may take a 'shot-
gun' approach in the complaint for damages, alleging all possible 
causes of action. A typical complaint might include the inten-
tional torts of assault, battery and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, as well as negligence and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.33 Some attorneys may add a cause of action 
against the victim's mother for negligent supervision. It may be 
alleged that the mother failed to provide protection or support 
for the victim of incest, even though she was fully aware of the 
facts. 34 
B. TIME-BAR BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Much attention in the area of tort claims based on incestu-
ous abuse has focused on the problems presented by delayed 
discovery of both the injury and its cause.3~ Plaintiffs may rely 
on the argument that the one year statute of limitations should 
not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the relation-
ship between the incestuous acts and her injuries.36 This 
'delayed discovery' argument is premised on the latent and often 
undiscoverable nature of incest injuries.37 California recently en-
31. Id. at 43. 
32.Id. 
33. See, e.g., Bechtel v. Bechtel, No. 303518 (Superior Court of California, County of 
Contra Costa tiled July 16, 1987). 
34. See generally J. HERMAN, supra note 4. The author cautions, however, that "no 
degree of maternal absence or neglect constitutes an excuse for paternal incest, unless 
one accepts the idea that fathers are entitled to female services within their families, no 
matter what the circumstances." Id. at 49. 
35. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3; Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the 
Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-term Damages, 25 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 191 (1985); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Pre-
serving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 189 (1984). 
36. See Comment, supra note 3, at 628-31; see also Comment, California Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 340.5: The Discovery Rule Codified? 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 759 (1983) 
(providing a thorough history of the delayed discovery rule in California). 
37. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
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acted legislation to extend the statute of limitations for tort 
claims based on incestuous abuse to three years. as There 
promises to be continued litigation and definition of the law in 
this area. 
One California court recently held that an incest victim 
could not take advantage of the delayed discovery doctrine if she 
had "discovered all of the facts essential to the cause of action" 
at the time the abuse occurred.as In that case, the plaintiff al-
leged that the sexual assaults were committed against her will, 
caused her great fear and that she had acceded to the defend-
ant's acts because she felt that he intended to carry out his 
threats of harm.40 The court stated that "[t]he immediate harm 
caused by the alleged assaults gave [her] a right to sue at that 
time."u Thus, it sustained a demurrer to the complaint which 
was based on the statute of limitations. n 
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) reads as follows: 
(a) In any civil action for injury or illness based upon 
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 years, 
fornication, sodomy, oral copulation, or penetration of genital 
or anal openings of another with a foreign object, in which this 
conduct is alleged to have occurred between a household or 
family member and a child where the act upon which the ac-
tion is based occurred before the plaintiff attained the age of 
18 years, the time for commencement of the action shall be 
three years. 
(b) "Injury or illness" as used in this section includes psy-
chological injury or illness, whether or not accompanied by 
physical injury or illness. 
(c) "Household or family member" as used in this section 
includes a parent, stepparent, former stepparent, sibling, step-
sibling, or any other person who regularly resided in the 
household at the time of the act, or who six months prior to 
the act regularly resided in the household. 
(d) Nothing in this bill is intended to preclude the courts 
from applying delayed discovery exceptions to the accrual of a 
cause of action for sexual molestation of a minor. 
(e) This section shall apply to both of the following: 
(1) Any action commenced on or after January I, 1987, 
including any action which would be barred by application of 
the period of limitation applicable prior to January I, 1987. 
(2) Any action commenced prior to January I, 1987, and 
pending on January I, 1987. 
39. DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d lOll, 1017, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (1987). 
40. [d. at 1015, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 369. 
41. [d. at 1017, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371. 
42. [d. A petition for review of the decision was denied by the California Supreme 
Court on March 11, 1988. 
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IV. INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 
A. HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICIES 
Mortgage holders generally require homeowners to carry in-
surance against loss,.8 The typical homeowner's policy is a 'pack-
age' of risk coverages which includes "liability coverage for the 
insureds' liability arising out of the covered premises."" Under 
this liability coverage a policy holder is insured against any "oc-
currence", generally defined as "an accident, including continu-
ous or repeated exposure to conditions."4o 
Insurers will defend the insured and pay for damages if a 
claim is made against an insured for bodily injury and property 
damage under the liability coverage of a policy"s However, such 
coverage usually excludes bodily injury or property damage 
"which is expected or intended by the insured."" Further, a pol-
icy typically includes all relative residents of the household as 
'insureds' under the policy'8 and excludes medical coverage for 
injuries to those household members,.e 
This examination of insurance coverage for incest torts will 
43. See 2 R.C. MAXWELL, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 380.102[1], 
at 380-65 (May 1987)(noting that "[i]f a property owner has a mortgage or deed of trust 
on the property, the lender's approval of the [homeowner's] policy will probably be 
required"). 
44. 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 1:61, at 152 
(rev. ed. 1984). 
45. 11 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 20 
§ 44:285, at 437 (rev. ed. 1984). 
46. See 1 G. COUCH, supra note 44, at § 1:61, at 152. Typical language of such a 
policy reads: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured 
for damages because of bodily injury or property damage 
to which this coverage applies, we will: 
a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for 
which the insured is legally liable; and 
b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our 
choice. We may make any investigation and settie any 
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation 
to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay 
for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our 
limit of liability. 
Id. at § 1:61, at 178. 
47. Id. at § 1:61, at 164. 
48. Id. at § 1:61, at 153. 
49. Id. at § 1:61, at 164. 
7
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focus on the exclusion for acts which are expected or intended 
by the insured and the exclusion for household members. 
B. POSSIBLE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIONS ON INCEST TORT CLAIMS 
When negligence is alleged in an incest tort claim the door 
opens to the possibility of coverage under the defendant's home-
owner's insurance policy.60 Insurers are likely to claim the in-
sured is not covered because of the exclusion for intentional acts 
and/or the exclusion for injuries to household members. 
Procedurally, insurers may dispute their duty to defend a 
claim in two different ways. An insurer may bring a motion for 
declaratory relief against the insured and the injured party to 
have the court declare whether the insurer is obligated to defend 
a suit against its insured and whether it will be liable for any 
judgment.61 If the court finds that the insurer is not liable for 
coverage of the claim, the insurer will be relieved of any further 
duty to defend the action.62 The critical consideration here is 
50. See 11 G. COUCH, supra note 45, § 44:285, at 437. The author notes that "con-
temporary liability policies generally provide coverage on an occurrence basis" and 
"highly probable or intentionally caused damage" is generally excluded from the defini-
tion of an "occurrence". 
51. 18 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 74:117, at 624; § 74:150, at 664 
(rev. ed. 1983). In California, a declaratory relief action is authorized by CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 1060 (West 1980), which reads as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will or other written 
instrument, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration 
of his rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, 
in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of 
the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual 
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the re-
spective parties, bring an original action in the superior court 
or file a cross-complaint in a pending action in the superior, 
municipal or justice court for a declaration of his rights and 
duties in the premises, including a determination of any ques-
tion of construction or validity arising under such instrument 
or contract. He may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, 
either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a 
binding declaration of such rights or duties, whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declara-
tion may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, 
and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. 
Such declaration may be had before there has been any breach 
of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought. 
52. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1060 which authorizes a court to make a "binding 
declaration" of rights and duties. 
8
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that if the claim is no longer covered under an insurance policy, 
the likelihood of a recovery for damages may be reduced, de-
pending on the personal resources of the defendant. 
In the alternative, an insurer may choose to defend the ac-
tion until a judgment is rendered and then bring an action for 
declaratory relief or wait for the insured to sue for satisfaction of 
the judgment.!!S Again, if the insurer succeeds, the plaintiff 
would have to rely on the defendant's personal resources for a 
satisfaction of the judgment. 
C. INSURANCE CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
Courts generally apply the same principles to construe in-
surance contracts as govern the interpretation of all contracts.!!4 
These principles may offer plaintiffs the greatest hope of suc-
cessfully arguing for coverage of injuries arising from incestuous 
abuse. 
Clauses which limit liability and exclude coverage are 
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the in-
sured.!!!! Any ambiguities in the terms of a contract are construed 
against the insurer.!!6 While a court will not force a construction 
which burdens an insurer with a risk it did not assume,!!7 it will, 
when possible, interpret a policy in a way that protects the in-
53. See 18 G. COUCH, supra note 51, at § 74:149, at 661 (commenting that an action 
for declaratory relief is available to a liability insurer to determine its liability to one 
obtaining a judgment against the insured). 
54. See 2 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 15:1, at 114 (rev. ed. 1983). 
55. Id. at § 15:48, at 283. See, e.g., Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title 
Ins. Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746,83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970) ("[P]rovisions relating to 
exclusions or exceptions from the performance of the basic, underlying obligation are 
construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured." Id. at 569, 
463 P.2d at 750, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 398). 
56. Id. at § 15:14, at 158-59. See, e.g., Harabedian v. Zurich Ins. Co. 218 Cal. App. 
2d 702, 707, 32 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1963) (quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Con-
str. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437-38, 296 P.2d 801, 809): 
If the insurer uses language that is uncertain any reasonable 
doubt will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent 
or fact of coverage, whether as to peril insured against, the 
amount of liability, or the person or persons protected, the 
language will be understood in its most inclusive sense for the 
benefit of the insured. 
57. Harabedian, 218 Cal. App. 2d at 707, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 816. 
9
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sured.1i8 Additionally, the interpretation of the policy is a ques-
tion of lawli9 and will not go before the jury unless its meaning is 
dependent on disputed facts. 8o Any exceptions to the basic cov-
erage offered by the policy must be clearly stated so that the 
insured will have notice of their effect.81 
The classic statement of California's judicial approach to in-
surance contract interpretation may be found in Continental 
Casualty Company v. Phoenix Construction Company:82 
58. [d. 
It is elementary in insurance law that any 
ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is 
to be resolved against the insurer. If semantically 
permissible, the contract will be given such con-
struction as will fairly achieve its object of secur-
ing indemnity to the insured for the losses to 
which the insurance relates. If the insurer uses 
language which is uncertain any reasonable doubt 
will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to 
extent or fact of coverage, whether as to peril in-
sured against, the amount of liability, or the per-
son or persons protected, the language will be un-
derstood in its most inclusive sense, for the 
benefit of the insured.s8 
59. 2 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 20, at § 15:3, at 116 (rev. ed. 1984). 
See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 
(1956); Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 
(1977). 
60. 1 G. COUCH, supra note 44, at § 15:3, at 120. 
61. See, e.g., Grey v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 262, 269-70, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72,54 
Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966). 
62. 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956). 
63. [d. at 438-39, 296 P.2d at 809-10 (citations omitted). See also 13 APPLEMAN, IN-
SURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 7401 et seq. (1979); 2 G. COUCH, supra note 59, at § 15:7, 
at 341-47: 
Many courts have said that a contract of insurance 
couched in language chosen by the insurer is, if open to the 
construction contended for by the insured, to be construed 
most strongly, or strictly, against the insurer and liberally in 
favor of the contention of the insured. Ambiguous or doubtful 
language or terms, it is said, must be given the strongest inter-
pretation against the insurer which they will reasonably bear, 
or, conversely, that the meaning of the words used that is 
most advantageous to the assured should be adopted, for the 
courts are not inclined to permit the insurer to take advantage 
of any ambiguity, especially when the plaintiff's cause is meri-
10
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These settled principles must be applied in an analysis of 
any insurance contract coverage question. Language is critical to 
the court's interpretation of an exclusionary clause. 
D. OCCURRENCE LIABILITY 
A threshold question when analyzing insurance coverage of 
an injury is whether the acts which led to the injury constitute 
an "occurrence" under a given liability policy.s. Historically, in-
surers sought to narrow the scope of coverage under liability pol-
icies to loss by "accidental means".S6 But courts have recognized 
that such an interpretation would afford very little coverage and 
would frustrate the reasonable expectations of the insureds.ss 
Thus, they have broadly defined coverage to include occurrences 
which are unforeseen, unexpected, and out of the ordinary, ei-
ther because they happened at all or because of the extent of the 
resultant damage.s7 An accident under this broader construction 
can be either a distinct event or a more slowly evolving process 
or exposureS8 and may include the unintended consequences of 
intentional acts.S9 One commentator has suggested that this lib-
eral construction is justified by the public interest in carrying 
out the reasonable expectations of the insured.70 
torious and the defense is technical. A better statement is that 
if an insurance contract is so drawn as to be equivocal, uncer-
tain, or ambiguous, and to require interpretation because 
fairly susceptible of two or more different, but sensible and 
reasonable constructions, the one will be adopted which, if 
consistent with the objects of the insurance, is most favorable 
to the insured. 
64. See, e.g., 14 G. COUCH, supra note 45, § 44:285, at 437. 
65. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT, § 5.4(e), at 302 (1971). 
66. Id. at § 5.4(e), at 304. See also Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 
295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946) (rejecting the distinction between accidental means 
and accidental results and allowing coverage in a case where the insured died trying to 
dig his car out of a snow-filled ditch). In Burr, a strict construction of the phrase "acci-
dental means" would have denied coverage because the insured's exertions while shovel-
ling snow were not accidental and could be inferred to have contributed to his death. See 
R. KEETON, supra note 63, at 304 n.7. 
67. R. KEETON, supra note 65, at 300. The author cites the 1966 Revision of the 
Standardized Liability Policy language which defines "occurrence" as an "accident, in-
cluding injurious exposure to conditions." He suggests that the language was intended to 
broaden coverage, particularly with respect to a continuing condition as distinguished 
from a sudden event. 
68.Id. 
69. 11 G. COUCH, supra note 45, at § 44:289, at 449. 
70. R. KEETON, supra note 65, at § 5.4(e), at 304. The author states that: 
11
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There is at least an indication that some courts would like 
to throw back the clocks to that more restrictive time when con-
struing policy coverage of sexual abuse cases. In one recent case, 
Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. Malcolm,71 a New 
Hampshire court refused to accept the argument that sexual as-
sault by an insured could be considered an "occurrence" for pur-
poses of determining coverage under a homeowner's policy.72 In 
Malcolm, the court had to interpret a policy which defined an 
"occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious exposure to 
conditions, which results, during the policy term, in bodily in-
jury."73 The court acknowledged that the term "occurrence" 
under the language of the policy was more inclusive than "acci-
dent",74 but insisted that an insured's intentional act could not 
be an "occurrence" when it was so inherently injurious that it 
could not be performed without causing the resulting injury.711 
In Malcolm, the underlying civil action alleged repeated 
sexual assaults by the defendent against an eleven-year-old boy 
during one weekend.76 The court found the alleged assaults in-
herently injurious, apparently because they fit into "the most se-
Id. 
[Dlespite their theoretical basis of interpreting the manifested 
intention of the contracting parties, the courts have, to serve a 
public interest, imposed a very considerable judicial restriction 
upon the freedom of contract. This restriction can be justified 
on the grounds that literal enforcement of the provisions on 
accidental means would afford such minimal coverage as to be 
patently disproportionate to the premiums paid and that 
there would be little occasion for buying insurance of such 
narrow scope, thus providing only against a risk defined in a 
bizarre way that would never be conceived by one stating his 
insurance needs. These considerations support the conclusion 
that literal enforcement would be inconsistent with reasonable 
expectations of insureds. 
71. 128 N.H. 521, 517 A.2d 800 (1986). 
72. Id. See also Western Nat'l Assur. Co. v. Hecker, 43 Wash. App. 816, 719 P.2d 
954 (1986) (holding that an alleged negligent act of forcible anal intercourse was not a 
covered "occurrence" or "accident" under a policy); Rodriquez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d 
381,729 P.2d 627, 629 (1986) (noting that "[wlere this an "accidental occurrence" policy, 
we would simply deny that coverage existed under the policy because the act of commit-
ting incest could not be described as an accidental occurrence". Id. at 384, 729 P.2d at 
629). 
73. Malcolm, 128 N.H. at 523, 517 A.2d at 802. 
74.Id. 
75.Id. 
76. Id. at 522, 517 A.2d at 801. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss3/3
1988] LITIGATING INCEST TORTS 551 
rious of sex offenses" under the state's criminal statutes." The 
court concluded its analysis by noting that "[i]f the insured did 
not intend to inflict the injury on the victim by his intentional 
act, and the act was not so inherently injurious that the injury 
was certain to follow from it, the act as a contributing cause of 
injury would be regarded as accidental and an "occurrence".78 
In its analysis the Malcolm court seemed to abandon the 
settled rules of contract interpretation and substitute tort law 
concepts instead.79 It imposed a foreseeability factor into the 
definition of "accidental" under the policy.80 The court was care-
ful however, to distinguish its holding from those in which the 
language of the policy referred to the injury as being neither ex-
pected nor intended "from the standpoint of the insured".81 It is 
unclear what the court would have ruled if such language, com-
mon to many policies, had been at issue. 
The California courts have not considered the issue of 
whether incestuous abuse may be an "occurrence" for purposes 
of insurance coverage under a homeowner's policy. However, a 
long line of authority suggests that the term "accidental" is 
given a broad construction in California and that "any event 
which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the 
person acted upon or effected by the event"82 will be considered 
an occurrence for purposes of liability insurance coverage.8S 
Courts have placed some limits on what may be considered 
occurrences under liability policies; however, these exceptions 
seem to be limited to cases where intentional torts are alleged in 
the underlying complaint.8• 
77. [d. at 525, 517 A.2d at 803. 
78. [d. 
79. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
80. Malcolm, 128 N.H. at 523, 517 A.2d at 802. 
81. [d. at 526, 517 A.2d at 803. 
82. Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 563, 334 
P.2d 881, 884 (1959). 
83. [d. See also Economy Lumber Co. of Oakland, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, 157 Cal. App. 3d 641, 204 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1984). 
84. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 226 Cal. Rptr. 
435 (1986) (where the complaint alleged fraud and the court held that Royal Globe was 
not obligated to defend its insured since all of the evidence indicated that the builder 
intentionally made a promise that he did not intend to keep); Commercial Union Ins. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 242 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1987) (where the complaint 
13
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Litigators should be cautioned that allegations of inten-
tional torts in an incestuous abuse case may lead to insurance 
coverage problems in this area. 
E. INTENTIONAL ACTS EXCLUSION 
Most liability insurance contracts include exclusions for in-
tentional acts committed by the insured.811 It is important to 
note that courts employ the rules of contract construction, not 
the principles of substantive law, to interpret the meaning of'in-
tent' when trying to determine whether the harm inflicted is 
covered by the defendant's policy.8s Thus, an injury might be 
covered under an insurance policy where an insured either in-
tends to inflict a minor impact or has no intention of harm at all 
and the resultant harm is much greater than what was in-
tended.87 Under tort law principles however, the tortfeasor 
would have to "take the frail plaintiff" as found for purposes of 
liability.88 
Courts take one of three approaches in trying to decide 
whether an act committed by the insured was the kind of act 
excluded by the insuranc~ policy.89 Many courts apply an objec-
tive standard of analysis, asking what results an ordinary person 
would expect from the act at issue without regard to subjective 
intent.90 Under this standard, once the injurious act is found to 
be intentional, there is no coverage if objectively the injury 
could be expected by the act.91 The standard is defended by 
such courts on the ground that public policy demands that an 
alleged wrongful termination and the court held that such an intentional act was not 
accidental as a matter of law). . 
85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
86. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT, § 5.4(b) (1971). 
87.Id. 
88.Id. 
89. Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance 
Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 ALR 4th 957, 
973 (1984). 
90. See, e.g., Mutual Servo Cas. Ins. CO. V. McGehee, 711 P.2d 826, 828 (Mont. 1985) 
("Where, as here, an assailant aggressively and intentionally strikes another in the face, 
it is irrelevant for the purposes of this insurance exclusion that the assailant causes an 
injury different in character or magnitude from the harm he subjectively intended."); 
Unigard Mut. Ins. CO. V. Spokane Sch. Dist. 81, 20 Wash. App. 261, 579 P.2d 1015 
(1978). 
91. McGehee, 711 P.2d at 828. 
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insured should not be indemnified against his or her own wrong-
doing.92 However, other courts attack the objective standard on 
the basis that "virtually no intentional act would ever be cov-
ered"B3 using such an analysis.B4 
Other jurisdictions use a subjective test: Did the insured in-
tend or expect the action taken to result in injury?BII In imple-
menting this standard courts rely on the plain language of the 
policy.B8 In other words, if the insured did not subjectively ex-
pect or intend the injury, the intentional act exclusion is inappli-
cable, regardless of the reasonableness of the expectation or 
intention. B7 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court employed a subjective 
test to interpret an insurance policy where the plaintiff was al-
leging an incest tort in MacKinnon v. Hanover Insurance Com-
pany.B8 In MacKinnon, the defendant stepfather allegedly sexu-
ally abused his six-year-old stepdaughter.BB He brought an 
action for declaratory relief against his insurance carrier to de-
termine coverage under his homeowner's policy.loO The com-
plaint stated causes of action for battery and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress. lol The policy excluded "bodily injury ... 
which is expected or intended by the insured. "102 The court held 
that the exclusion referred to the defendant's actual expectation 
or intention.l03 
92. [d. See also 7A ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4492:01, at 21 (1979). 
93. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986). The 
court noted that U[i)ntentional acts which result in injury generally can be expected to 
result in injury." [d. at 386, 729 P.2d at 630. 
94. [d. 
95. See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co. 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984); 
Alabama Farm Bur. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So.2d 921 (Ala. 1984) (wrongful 
death case in which the subjective intent of the policyholder was considered to be 
crucial). 
96. MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167. Here, the court stated that 
"[t)here is no indication that 'bodily injury ... expected or intended by the insured' 
refers to anything other than actual expectation or intention, as to the bodily injury, in 
the mind of the insured at the time he took the action allegedly resulting in injury." [d. 
97. [d. 
98. 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984). 
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The meaning of the language is plain and the 
common meaning of the language governs. There 
is no indication that 'bodily injury ... expected or 
intended by the insured' refers to anything other 
than actual expectation or intention, as to the 
bodily injury, in the mind of the insured at the 
time he took the action allegedly resulting in 
injury.lo4 
The court remanded the action back to the Superior Court to 
determine the defendant's intent as to the claimed injuries. 1011 
Finally, there are recent cases in which the court infers in-
tent as a matter of law when sexual abuse is involved. l06 In these 
decisions an intent to harm is inferred even in the absence of 
subjective intent where the court decides that harm is inherent 
in the nature of the act.107 Courts sometimes justify this infer-
ence on the basis that the legislature has made the act a 
crime. lOB 
In Rodriquez v. Williams/os the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that an insured intended harm as a matter of law 
when he committed incest and thus there was no coverage under 
his homeowner's policy because of the intentional act exclusion-
ary clause.llo The actual subjective intent of the insured was ir-
relevant in this court's analysis, III as was the fact that the scope 
of the injuries might have been much greater or different from 
injuries which objectively might have been expected.l12 
The MacKinnon court rejected the approach which infers 
intent as a matter of law principally because it violates "the 
usual rules of construction in cases of insurance contracts by in-
104. [d. (citations omitted). 
105. [d. at 458, 471 A.2d at 1169. 
106. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986); Tran-
samerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 143 Ariz. 351, 694 P.2d 181 (1984); State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Judith G., 379 
N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1986); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982). 
107. Rodriguez, 107 Wash. 2d at 387, 729 P.2d at 630. 
108. [d. 
109. 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986). 
110. [d. 
111. [d. at 387, 729 P.2d at 630. 
112. [d. 
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jecting concepts of substantive tort law into the process."ll3 Ac-
cording to that court, the insurer could have expressly excluded 
coverage of acts that were certain to produce injury in the lan-
guage of its policy, but had not done SO.114 
In Zordan By and Through Zordan u. Page,tll'> a Florida 
court followed the MacKinnon court's reasoning, holding that 
coverage would not be excluded under an intentional injury ex-
clusion clause where the insured allegedly sexually fondled a 
child. lIS The court held that the exclusionary clause was inappli-
cable unless the insured acted with specific intent to cause inju-
ries.117 The court rejected the reasoning of many jurisdictions 
which hold that intent may be inferred as a matter of law in 
cases involving sexual abuse. ll8 It acknowledged that while "one 
may have a first, visceral reaction which is strongly adverse to 
any conclusion that a person who engages in sexual fondling of.a 
child may be covered by liability insurance,"ll8 it would fail in 
its judicial responsibility if it allowed such a reaction to govern 
its decision.l2O The Zordan court accepted the MacKinnon 
court's argument that intent should not be inferred where the 
insurer could have expressly provided for an exclusion.l21 It ad-
ditionally argued that "doubtful insurance coverage questions 
must be resolved against the insurer."122 
This reasoning was reiterated by an Alabama federal dis-
trict court in State Auto Mutual Insurance Company u. McIn-
tyre. 123 That court found insurance coverage for injuries result-
ing from the 'non-violent' sexual abuse of his granddaughter by 
the insured, notwithstanding an exclusion for injuries intended 
or expected by the insured.124 The McIntyre court noted that 
"the presumption in tort and criminal law that a person intends 
the natural and probable consequences of his or her intentional 
113. MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 458, 471 A.2d at 1168. 
114. [d. 
115. 500 So.2d 608 (Fla.App.2 Dist. 1986). 
116. [d. 
117. [d. at 609-10. 
118. [d. at 611. 




123. 652 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1987). 
124. [d. at 1177. 
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acts has no application to the interpretation of the terms. . . . 
The policy terms 'expected or intended injury' cannot be 
equated with 'foreseeable injury'."l25 
According to the McIntyre court, the key to reaching a cor-
rect legal result was the recognition and application of the 
state's "settled principles governing the construction and appli-
cation of insurance policies. "126 It used a "purely subjective 
standard"127 and placed the burden squarely on the insurer to 
establish that the insured expected or intended the injury.128 
Many states have passed statutory restrictions on the use of 
exclusionary clauses by an insurer. 1Z9 Under California's statute, 
an act by the insured must be 'wilful' in order for the insurer to 
take advantage of the exclusion. ISO The insurer must establish 
that its insured committed the wrongful acts with a specific in-
tent to cause harm or a "preconceived design to inflict injury."181 
Under this standard, the insured's subjective intent, rather than 
the physical nature of the acts committed, determines whether 
the insured's policy covers the act at issue.ls2 Thus, California 
courts support the view that the insured must have intended the 
act as well as some kind of bodily injury in order for the inten-
tional injury exclusion clause to apply. This is particularly 
promising for women bringing suit for incest torts since studies 
tell us that the incest tortfeasor does not generally intend to 
harm his victim. ISS 
There has not been an appellate court decision in California 
dealing with the exclusion of intentional acts from coverage 
under homeowner's policies in the specific context of incest. 
125. Id. at 1187. 
126. Id. at 1194. 
127. Id. at 1187. 
128. Id. at 1195. 
129. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988); "An insurer is not 
liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the 
negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others." 
130. Id. 
131. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 887, 587 P.2d 1098, 1110, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 285, 297 (1978). 
132. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 849-50, 206 Cal. 
Rptr. 823, 827-28 (1984); Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 
91 Cal. App. 3d 690, 695-98, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350-52 (1979). 
133. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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However, California decisions interpreting the intentional act 
exclusion clauses suggest that courts use a subjective approach, 
and construe the clauses strictly against the insurer .1S. 
The seminal California decision in this area, Clemmer v. 
Hartford Insurance Company/Sli was an action by holders of a 
wrongful death judgment against an insured who had been con-
victed of second degree murder for the decedent's death. lSG The 
trial court held that the heirs could litigate the issue of the in-
sured's mental state at the time of the shooting even though he 
had been found guilty in a criminal proceeding.ls7 The jury 
found that the insured had not had the intent required to ex-
clude this act from coverage, and thus, the insurance company 
was liable for damages to the heirs.13G The California Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had properly im-
posed upon the insurer the burden of proving that the insured 
had committed a wilful act. l39 The court noted that there was a 
"clear line of authority"140 in California to the effect that an act 
which is intentional or wilful under "traditional tort princi-
ples"Hl must be done with a "preconceived design to inflict in-
jury"H2 in order to exonerate an insurer from providing 
coverage. l•S 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Overton/·· a California appel-
late court rejected the argument that an insured's criminal con-
viction for battery established his mental state for purposes of 
insurance coverage. The plaintiff in the underlying action al-
134. See, e.g., Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 285 (1978); Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 91 Cal. 
App. 3d 690, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979); Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 642 
P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982) (fact that an insured might be liable for punitive 
damages for conduct evidencing a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others 
held not to preclude his insurer's obligation to indemnify him for compensatory damages 
if his conduct did not rise to the level of an intent to cause injury); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984). 
135. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978). 
136. Id. 







144. 160 Cal. App. 3d 843, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984). 
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leged that the insured had struck him in the face. UII The court 
was unwilling to infer intent for purposes of insurance coverage 
because a judgment of conviction for battery does not necessa-
rily determine intent to injure.148 In California, the wilfulness el-
ement of the crime of battery can be satisfied by showing an 
intent to do the act, it does not require an intent to injure. U7 
According to the court, an insurer in California must show a spe-
cific intent to injure in order to take advantage of an intentional 
act exclusionary clause. U8 
In Congregation of Rodef Sholom of Marin v. American 
Motorists Insurance Company,t49 a sixteen-year-old boy set fire 
to a wastebasket in his classroom at the Rodef Sholom syna-
gogue causing property damage. lIIo The synagogue sued the boy 
and his parents for damages and got a judgment.1I1l The syna-
gogue then brought an action seeking coverage under the fam-
ily's homeowner's policy.11l2 The court held that there was cover-
age under the policy.lIIS It noted that "it is the intent to cause 
damage beyond the point of origin of the fire which is the intent 
that makes the exclusion applicable. "1114 It rejected the notion 
that an insurer would be exonerated from coverage where an act 
is intentional within the meaning of "traditional tort princi-
ples"11111 without a finding of a "preconceived design to inflict in-
jury".11l8 The court stated that "the public's strong interest in 
the compensation of victims reinforces the well settled principle 
that such exclusionary clauses should be interpreted as narrowly 
as possible. "m 
145. [d. at 847, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 825. 
146. [d. at 849, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 827. 
147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1988) reads: 
The word 'willfully', when applied to the intent with 
which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or 
willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred 
to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure 
another, or to acquire any advantage. 
148. Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 827. 
149. 91 Cal. App. 3d 690, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1979). 
150. [d. 
151. [d. at 693, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 349. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. at 698, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352. 
154. [d. at 695, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 350. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. at 696, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 351. 
157. [d. 
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The one California appellate court decision which has con-
sidered insurance coverage in the context of sexual molestation 
stands in stark contrast to the above noted line of decisions. In 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kim W.,lIiB an insurer filed a declara-
tory relief action seeking a declaration that a homeowner's pol-
icy issued to the insured provided no coverage for sexual as-
saults by the insured against the minor plaintiff in the 
underlying action.ui9 The homeowners' policy at issue contained 
a clause excluding coverage for "bodily injury or property dam-
age intentionally caused by an insured person."160 When he an-
swered the complaint, the insured admitted that he had violated 
the penal code statute prohibiting sexual and physical abuse of a 
minor. I61 The court concluded that a violation of the penal code 
section constituted a wilful act as a matter of lawI62 and affirmed 
a grant of summary judgment for the insurer. I63 
Kim W. portends to be the decision that insurance compa-
nies will rely upon when the issue of intentional act exclusions in 
the context of incest reaches California's high court. It is impor-
tant to note however, that the court in Kim W. did not hold that 
intent can be inferred as a matter of law in sexual abuse cases. 
Rather, it reasoned that the wording of the penal code statute 
indicated the legislature's determination that at least some harm 
was inherent in such conduct.I6• The court therefore concluded 
that an intent to cause some harm could be inferred as a matter 
of law from the insured's admission that he violated the stat-
ute. I611 In Florida, the Zordan court distinguished its holding 
from that in Kim W., noting that the public policy applicable to 
criminal law is not always automatically applicable in a civil 
action. 166 
To infer intent as a matter of law when there is an admis-
sion to acts of sexual abuse would conflict squarely with the long 
line of California cases holding that an insured's state of mind or 
158. 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984). 
159. [d. 
160. [d. at 329, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611. 
161. [d. at 330, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (referring to CAL. PENAL CODE § 288). 
162. [d. at 333, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613. 
163. [d. at 335, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 615. 
164. [d. at 332, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613. 
165. [d. 
166. Zordan ex rei. Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 608, 610 (Fla. App. 2 Diat. 1986). 
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intent, rather than the nature of his acts, determines coverage. 167 
This subjective standard relies on a very careful analysis of the 
facts on a case by case basis. 
Further, to infer intent as a matter of law in sexual abuse 
cases would be contrary to traditional principles of insurance 
contract interpretation.16B A principled interpretation of a policy 
which excludes coverage of "bodily injury ... expected or in-
tended by the insured" begins by looking at the "common mean-
ing of the language."169 The MacKinnon court had no trouble 
finding that the language referred to "actual expectation or 
intention. "170 
Another argument used by opponents of the subjective stan-
dard is that public policy dictates that an insured should not be 
indemnified against liability for the consequences of his own 
wrongdoing,l7l But, as the Rode! Sholom court found, public 
policy also dictates that victims should be compensated.172 
While the facts in many instances of incestuous abuse might 
give rise to an inference of intent, the intent to injure is not 
there in most instances.173 One of the reasons that this kind of 
sexual abuse is so psychologically harmful to a child is because it 
is not done with an intent to injure.17• If the intent to injure was 
present, it would be easier for a child to identify the behavior as 
wrong and to resist it.l7II Most often however, incestuous abuse is 
combined with and confused with parentallove.176 When the in-
sured does not intend to injure the child, insurance coverage 
should be available for any resultant injuries if the language of a 
policy allows coverage under traditional principles of insurance 
contract construction.177 
167. See, e.g., supra notes 133-60 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
169. See MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167, citing Baker v. McCarthy, 
122 N.H. 171, 175, 443 A.2d 138, 140 (1982). 
170. MacKinnon, 124 N.H. at 457, 471 A.2d at 1167. 
171. [d. at 458, 471 A.2d at 1168. 
172. See Roder Sholom, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 697, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 352. 




177. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss3/3
1988] LITIGATING INCEST TORTS 561 
F. HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION/TIME OF OCCURRENCE 
Homeowners' insurance policies generally do not afford cov-
erage of injuries to residents of the household.178 However, 
courts generally will interpret policy terminology to extend cov-
erage whenever possible.179 The use of a broad or narrow con-
struction will depend on which interpretation of the facts, if rea-
sonable, will provide coverage. 180 
A well-settled general rule places the time of an occurrence 
within the meaning of a liability policy to be the time when the 
damage occurred, not the time that the wrongful act was com-
mitted.18l The manifestation of injury from incestuous abuse 
178. A typical household exclusion in a homeowner's policy reads: 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses incurred or medi-
cally ascertained within three years from the date of an acci-
dent causing bodily injury. Medical expenses means reasona-
ble charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance, 
hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices and funeral 
services. This coverage does not apply to you or regular resi-
dents of your household other than residence employees. 
See 1 G. COUCH, supra note 44, at § 1:61, at 164. 
179. Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Boisseranc, 151 Cal. App. 2d 775, 312 P.2d 401 (1957) 
"[W)e start the problem of interpretation with the rule that the policy must be con-
strued so as to give James the benefit of any reasonable interpretation that may bring 
him within its coverage." [d. at 781, 312 P.2d at 404. 
180. See, e.g., Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Home Indem. Co. 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, 
308, 50 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511-12 (1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 9 Cal. App. 3d 898, 902, 
88 Cal. Rptr. 593, 596 (1970). See also Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Davis, 90 Cal. App. 
3d 782, 784-85, 153 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (1979). In Davis, the court relied on CAL. GOV'T 
CODE § 244, which deals with the interpretation of residence. That code section reads in 
pertinent part: 
In determining the place of residency the following 
rules shall be observed: 
(b) there can only be one residence; 
(c) a residence cannot be lost until another is 
gained; 
(d) the residence of the parent with whom an 
unmarried minor child maintains his or her 
place of abode is the residence of such 
unmarried minor child. 
(e) the residence of an unmarried minor who has 
a parent living cannot be changed by his or 
her own act; 
(f) the residence can be changed only by the union 
of act and intent. 
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 244 (West 1980). 
181. Schrillo v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (formerly Highlands Ins. Co v. Schrillo 
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typically involves a continuous and progressive process that ex-
tends over many years.182 In California, some courts have taken 
the position that, where the facts reveal a progressive develop-
ment and accumulation of injuries over time, the time of "occur-
rence" triggering coverage is the whole period of time during 
which the injuries thus progressively develop and occur.183 This 
"continuing injury" doctrine is particularly appropriate for judi-
cial analysis of insurance coverage of incest torts under a house-
hold exclusion clause. 
It is important however, not to confuse the "continuing in-
jury" doctrine with the "delayed discovery" doctrine.184 Courts 
have held that the delayed discovery of an injury does not affect 
the time of the occurrence of an injury for purposes of determin-
ing the applicable policy period for coverage.1811 Thus, a claimant 
must be able to allege a continuing and progressive injury in or-
der to take advantage of the doctrine; delayed discovery is insuf-
ficient in and of itself. 
The continuing injury doctrine is best exemplified by the 
California appellate court decision in California Union Ins. Co. 
v. Landmark Ins. CO .. 18S That case involved a dispute between 
successive insurers as to which should indemnify the insured for 
property damages that occurred over a two-year period.187 Ac-
cording to the undisputed facts, improper subgrading during 
construction of a swimming pool caused cracks to develop in the 
pool shell leading to underground leakage from the pool which 
resulted in soil slippage.188 Ultimately, certain structures on the 
property were damaged.189 Landmark was the insurer during the 
initial construction and occurrence of property damage.19o It 
paid for repairs without knowing about the underlying causes, 
Co.), 181 Cal. App. 3d 766, 773, 226 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 (1986). 
182. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. 
183. See California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 474-
78, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 468-71 (1983). 
184. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
185. See, e.g., Tijsseling v. General Ace., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 
623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976). 
186. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983). 
187. 1d. 
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which continued to cause damage over time.19l Subsequently, 
during California Union's policy term, new property damage oc-
curred and the underlying causes were discovered.192 
Landmark argued that it should not have to pay for any of 
the property damage that occurred after its policy term had en-
ded.19s California Union responded that, because the injuries 
which occurred during its policy term were a continuation of in-
juries that had actually incepted and been caused during 
Landmark's term, all the damages should be Landmark's re-
sponsibility.19. Paradoxically, both sides argued that the general 
rule fixing the time of "occurrence" as the time of actual injury 
or damage supported its position.1911 
The court concluded that this general principle was inappo-
site given the facts before it. 19G It found that during the entire 
period of time at issue "the damage was accumulating and be-
coming progressively more severe."197 The court resolved the sit-
uation by regarding the entire time period during which the in-
juries progressively developed as the time of "occurrence" 
triggering coverage, thus holding each insurer jointly and sever-
ally liable for all of the damages. 198 
The court in California Union relied on two products liabil-
ity cases involving the manufacturers of asbestos products, In-
surance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 
Inc.199 and Keene Corporation v. Insurance Company of North 
America.20o In Forty-Eight Insulations, the Sixth Circuit rea-
soned that cumulative diseases such as asbestosis are different 
from ordinary accidents or diseases and thus must be treated 
differently by the judiciary.20l It noted that the theory of liabil-
ity in asbestos cases is that the continuous exposure to asbestos 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 468, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 465. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 470, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 465. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467. 
198. Id. at 473-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467-71. 
199. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
200. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). 
201. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1219. 
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particles allowed asbestosis to progress to the point where it 
caused injury or death.202 The court reasoned that "the con-
tracting parties would expect coverage to parallel the theory of 
liability."208 In holding that insurers would be liable for coverage 
of asbestos claims from the time of exposure to the disease, to 
and including its manifestation, the court stated that it was 
bound to "broadly construe the policies to promote coverage."204 
In Keene, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that coverage of asbestosis was not limited to the time the 
disease manifested itself, but was triggered by inhalation of as-
bestosis particles, the subsequent development of the disease 
and its manifestation.20G In so holding, the court noted its obli-
gation to construe coverage under the policies with the objective 
of giving effect to the policies' dominant purpose of indem-
nity.206 It acknowledged that the particular terms of the insur-
ance policies were ambiguous as applied to such a slowly evolv-
ing disease, but that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the 
insured.207 
The Keene court's "multiple trigger" theory in which the 
injury is understood to have "occurred" at exposure, manifesta-
tion, and the period of latency was recently adopted by a Cali-
fornia court in asbestos related litigation.208 The California Su-
perior Court tentatively ruled that because asbestosis has been 
demonstrated to be a disease in which bodily injury occurs in a 
continuing and progressive manner over time, the time period of 
the occurrence of injury triggering coverage consists of the whole 
time period during which the disease develops, beginning with 
the time of exposure and continuing until death or a claim is 
filed. 209 
Analogies can easily be drawn between the asbestos cases, 
202. [d. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. at 1219, 1223. 
205. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1245. 
206. [d. at 1041. 
207. [d. 
208. Asbestosis Insurance Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding 
No. 1072 (Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco tentative ruling May 29, 
1987). 
209. [d. at 43-45. 
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California Union, and many cases involving incestuous abuse 
torts. An insured's wrongful conduct causes deep-seated and 
hidden injuries to the victim which develop and multiply over 
time, causing the progressive occurrence of many specific inju-
ries.21o Under the "continuing injury" theory the victim of an 
incest tort may not be covered for the period of time she resides 
in the insured's household, but would be covered for the time 
after she moves out during which her injuries continue to de-
velop and accumulate. Applying the reasoning of the California 
Union court, all insurers from the inception of the injuries 
throughout their progressive development would be jointly and 
severally liable for liability coverage. 
It must be recognized however, that the use of this continu-
ing injury doctrine would preclude a claim of multiple occur-
rences based on incestuous abuse occurring over many years. A 
claim of multiple occurrences could potentially result in a much 
higher recovery, while reliance on a single occurrence limits re-
covery to the policy's "per occurrence" limits.211 
v. CONCLUSION 
Torts based on incestuous abuse present special problems to 
the litigator because of the unique characteristics of incest. One 
of the biggest problems is the tendency of some courts to infuse 
substantive tort law into the interpretation of insurance con-
tracts when coverage questions involve sexual abuse. Principles 
of contract interpretation require courts to construe questiona-
ble coverage in favor of the insured. Under these principles, in-
cest torts should be covered by homeowner's insurance policies 
when the injury was neither expected nor intended by the in-
sured, unless the insurer has expressly stated otherwise in the 
language of the contract. 
The injuries related to incestuous abuse develop very slowly 
over time and in that way are similar to asbestosis. The "multi-
ple trigger" analysis used by some courts when determining as-
210. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. 
211. See, e.g., California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468 
(holding that the continuing injury to the insured's property constituted one occurrence 
for purposes of insurance coverage). 
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bestosis insurance coverage issues is appropriate to use when an-
alyzing coverage of incest torts as well. Such an analysis would 
allow a victim of incestuous abuse who resided in the insured's 
household during a portion of the evolution of the injury to 
claim coverage of the injury for the period of time after she is no 
longer a member of the household. 
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